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Two avowable quantum communication schemes are proposed. One is an avowable teleportation
protocol based on the quantum cryptography. In this protocol one teleports a set of one-particle
states based on the availability of an honest arbitrator, the keys and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
pairs shared by the communication parties and the arbitrator. The key point is that the fact of
the teleportation can neither be disavowed by the sender nor be denied by the receiver. Another
is an avowable quantum secure direct communication scheme. A one-way Hash function chosen by
the communication parties helps the receiver to validate the truth of the information and to avoid
disavowing for the sender.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the essential features of quantum informa-
tion is its capacity for entanglement. Entanglement is
a uniquely quantum mechanical resource that plays a
key role in many of the most interesting applications of
quantum computation and quantum information, such
as quantum teleportation [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], quantum key
distribution [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], quantum secure direct com-
munication [11, 12, 13, 14, 15], quantum secret sharing
[16, 17] and so on.
When the pure state entanglement is shared by the
sender Alice and the receiver Bob, it allows them to send
quantum data with classical communication via telepor-
tation [1]. Quantum computation and quantum informa-
tion have revealed a plethora of methods for interchang-
ing resources, many built upon quantum teleportation, so
it is commonly understood as one of the most important
aspects of quantum information theory. Quantum tele-
portation has attracted widespread attention since the
seminal work on teleportation by Bennett et al [1]. So
far research work on quantum teleportation has got great
development, theoretical and experimental [2, 3, 4, 5] as
well.
Another important aspect of quantum information is
quantum secure direct communication, in which the two
parties communicate important messages directly with-
out first establishing a shared secret key to encrypt
them and the message is deterministically sent through
the quantum channels, but can be read only after ob-
taining an additional classical information for each bit
[11, 12, 13, 14].
The purpose of classical signature is to guarantee the
communication process neither to be disavowed by the
sender nor to be denied by the receiver. In other words,
the signature can ensure the validity of the communica-
tion. Recently, Zeng et al [18] and Gottesman et al [19]
proposed the quantum signature schemes by combining
the classical signature idea and quantum cryptography.
Obviously the avowable (or signatory) communication
schemes are needed in the modern society. In present
paper we will first propose an avowable (or signatory)
teleportation protocol based on the availability of an hon-
est arbitrator, the keys and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) pairs shared by the communication parties and
the arbitrator. Then an avowable scheme of quantum
secure direct communication based on digital signature
will be presented. Here the receiver can validate the truth
of the information and avoid disavowing for the sender
with the virtue of a one-way Hash function chosen by the
communication parties.
II. AN AVOWABLE TELEPORTATION
SCHEME BASED ON QUANTUM
CRYPTOGRAPH
Quantum teleportation is a technique for moving quan-
tum states around, even in the absence of a quantum
communication channel linking the sender of the quan-
tum state to the recipient. An avowable teleportation
scheme means that the quantum teleportation can nei-
ther be disavowed by the sender nor be denied by the
receiver.
Assume that there are members Alice, Bob and an hon-
est arbitrator Charlie in a communication group. Now
the sender Alice wants to transmit a set of unknown
single-particle states
|u〉i = αi|0〉i+βi|1〉i, |αi|2+|βi|2 = 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (1)
to the receiver Bob. In order to realize avowable tele-
portation we need an honest arbitrator Charlie sharing
the secret keys Ka and Kb with Alice and Bob respec-
tively. Of course, the secret keys Ka and Kb can be
generated via mature quantum cryptography, for exam-
ple BB84 protocol [6], so that the keys are unconditional
security [20]. We also suppose that the arbitrator can
make and distribute EPR pairs
|φ+〉CAA =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)CAA (2)
2between him and Alice, and
|φ+〉CBB =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)CBB (3)
between him and Bob. Here CA and CB indicate the
particles held by Charlie. Now we present the avowable
teleportation scheme in details as follows.
1) Alice sends the arbitrator an application indicating
that she wants to teleport a set of unknown quantum
states to the receiver Bob. The communication between
Alice and Charlie should be encrypted by using the key
Ka.
2) When the arbitrator Charlie has received the en-
crypted message of the application, he decrypts the secret
information to prove Alice’s identity. After that the EPR
pair channel between Alice and Bob is established by us-
ing entanglement swapping [21]. That is, Charlie makes
a measurement on the particles CA, CB in the Bell base
{|φ+〉CACB , |φ−〉CACB , |ψ+〉CACB , |ψ−〉CACB}, where
|φ+〉CACB =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)CACB ,
|φ−〉CACB =
1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)CACB ,
|ψ+〉CACB =
1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)CACB ,
|ψ−〉CACB =
1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)CACB . (4)
As
|φ+〉CAA|φ+〉CBB
=
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)CAA
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)CBB
=
1
2
(|φ+〉CACB |φ+〉AB + |φ−〉CACB |φ−〉AB
+|ψ+〉CACB |ψ+〉AB + |ψ−〉CACB |ψ−〉AB), (5)
so the outcome of the Bell measurement on the particles
CA, CB determines the state of the particles A,B [21].
Then Charlie sends n outcomes of the Bell measurement
on the particles CA, CB to Alice secretly by using the key
Ka.
3) When Alice has received the secret results of the
measurement sent by Charlie, she decrypts it. If the
result of the measurement is |φ+〉 (|φ−〉, |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉),
Alice performs a unitary transformations I ( σz , σx, iσy)
on the particle A to change the state of the particles A
and B into
|φ+〉AB = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)AB. (6)
Here I is the identity operator, σx, σy, σz are Pauli op-
erators. By now n perfect EPR pairs have been built
between Alice and Bob.
4) Alice makes a Bell measurement on the particles i
and A. The results of the Bell measurement are written
as {|Bell〉iA}. Then she encrypts them using Ka (the
key between Alice and Charlie) to get
Sa = Ka({|Bell〉iA}). (7)
After that she informs Charlie about the outcome of Sa
via the classical channels.
As a matter of fact, the overall state of the particles i,
A, and B can be written as
|Ψ〉iAB
= |u〉i ⊗ |φ+〉AB
=
1√
2
(αi|000〉+ βi|100〉+ αi|011〉+ βi|111〉)iAB
=
1
2
[|φ+〉iA(αi|0〉+ βi|1〉)B + |φ−〉iA(αi|0〉 − βi|1〉)B
+|ψ+〉iA(βi|0〉+ αi|1〉)B + |ψ−〉12(−βi|0〉+ αi|1〉)B].
(8)
Here |φ±〉iA = 1√
2
(|00〉±|11〉)iA and |ψ±〉iA = 1√
2
(|01〉±
|10〉)iA are four Bell states of particles i and A. Thus
when Alice makes a Bell measurement on two particles
i, A, then regardless of the identity of |u〉i, each outcome
will occur with equal probability 1
4
. Hence after this
measurement the resulting state of Bob’s particle will be
respectively
(αi|0〉+ βi|1〉)B = I|u〉B, (9)
(αi|0〉 − βi|1〉)B = σz |u〉B,
(βi|0〉+ αi|1〉)B = σx|u〉B,
(−βi|0〉+ αi|1〉)B = iσy|u〉B.
Obviously, in each case the state of Bob’s particle is re-
lated to |u〉 by a fixed unitary transformation indepen-
dent of the identity of |u〉. Thus if Bob obtains Alice’s
actual Bell measurement outcome, then Bob will be able
to apply the corresponding inverse unitary transforma-
tion to particle B, restoring it to state |u〉B in each case.
5) Charlie decrypts Sa and obtains {|Bell〉iA} using
the key Ka. Then he encrypts {|Bell〉iA} using the key
Kb (the key between Bob and Charlie) to obtain
Sc = Kb({|Bell〉1A(i)}). (10)
Later on Charlie sends message Sc to Bob via the classical
channel.
6) Bob decrypts Sc and obtains {|Bell〉iA} using the
key Kb, then Bob can perform a series of appropriate
unitary transformations according to the information of
{|Bell〉iA}, respectively. By far, quantum states {|u〉i},
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) has been teleported from the sender Alice
to the receiver Bob successfully.
Avowable is the notable feature of this teleportation
protocol. Since Alice’s key Ka and Bob’s key Kb are
contained in the classical information Sa and Sc, if Alice
disavows her behavior, it is very easy to be discovered.
At the same time, Bob can not deny having received the
quantum state also. Hence the process of above telepor-
tation is of legalization.
3III. AN AVOWABLE QUANTUM SECURE
DIRECT COMMUNICATION SCHEME BASED
ON DIGITAL SIGNATURE
In this section we propose an avowable quantum secure
direct communication scheme based on digital signature.
A one-way Hash function chosen by the communication
parties helps the receiver to validate the truth of the in-
formation and to avoid disavowing for the sender.
Suppose that Alice would like to transmit a message
M , a classical bit string M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}, to Bob
secretly, where mk ∈ {0, 1}. We also assume that there
are two channels between Alice and Bob. One is a classi-
cal communication channel; the other is a quantum com-
munication channel, which is assumed to be insecure and
the eavesdropper can manipulate the quantum signal in
any way she desires. Next we introduce a procedure
of the avowable quantum secure direct communication
scheme based on digital signature. The steps of the pro-
tocol are as follows.
1) Alice and Bob choose a one-way Hash function H(x)
together. The one-way Hash function implies that it is
easy to calculate H(M) from M but it is very difficult
to calculate M from H(M). Here the Hash function can
be obtained through a faithful arbitrator, he will be a
notarial center when the sender is disavowable.
2) Alice prepares l EPR pairs in the state 1√
2
(|00〉 +
|11〉)AB. The set of these l EPR pairs is expressed as
{φAB(j)} (j = 1, 2, . . . , l), where l ≈ 2n, then she sends
particle B of each EPR pair to Bob via the quantum
channel.
3) After having received l particles sent by Alice, Bob
choose randomly (l − n) ≈ n particles to test the secu-
rity of the quantum channel. He measures these parti-
cles in the basis {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} at random, where
|±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉± |1〉), then he tells Alice the base sequence
he used. Alice chooses the same bases to perform mea-
surements on the corresponding particles in her side and
announces the measurement results. Then they compare
their results publicly via the classical channel, if the re-
sults are indeed perfectly correlated, it is shown that the
channels is secure. We express the untested subset of the
EPR pairs as {φAB(i)} (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), and Alice’s and
Bob’s particles as {φA(i)} (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and {φB(i)}
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n), respectively. So far a perfect EPR pair
channel has be established between Alice and Bob.
4) Alice encrypts the message M on n EPR pairs. If
mk is 0, then Alice performs a unitary transformation I =
|0〉〈0|+|1〉〈1| on the particle φA(k); ifmk is 1, she applies
a unitary transformation σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|, one of the
Pauli operators, on the particle φA(k). After performing
the unitary transformation the resulting state of the EPR
pair will be
I|φ〉AB = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)AB (11)
and
σx|φ〉AB = 1√
2
(|10〉+ |01〉)AB, (12)
respectively.
5) Alice performs {|0〉, |1〉} base measurements on
{φA(i)} and announces the results of her measurements
via the classical channel.
6) Alice transformsM intoH(M) by the Hash function
which they had chosen together, then she sends H(M)
to Bob publicly.
7) After Bob received the outcomes of Alice’s measure-
ment and H(M), Bob performs {|0〉, |1〉} base measure-
ments on particles {φB(i)}. By using equations (11) and
(12) we can conclude that if the outcome of Alice’s mea-
surement is the same with that of Bob’s, the messagemk
is 0; otherwise the message mk is 1. Hence according to
the results of both Alice’s and Bob’s measurement, Bob
can obtain the message M ′.
8) Bob calculates H(M ′) from M ′ by the same Hash
function which they had chosen together, and compares
H(M) and H(M ′), if H(M) = H(M ′), the signature of
the messageM is true, then accepts it, otherwise discards
it.
In our scheme, two parties of the communication, Al-
ice and Bob, transform the information freely, until the
sender is disavowable. Because the common Hash func-
tion is obtained through an arbitrator, who can testify
whether the sender tell a lie or not. At the same time,
this scheme can validate the truth of the information, if
the message is not authentic, then H(M) 6= H(M ′), the
receiver Bob will discard it.
IV. SECURITY
Our schemes are secure. It is easy to see that these two
schemes can not only prevent Eve from attacking but also
avoid disavowing. The former is a quantum teleportation
based on the quantum cryptography, where we choose the
method of BB84 protocol that is unconditionally secure
[20], to generate and distribute the keys as well as to
detect the eavesdropping of Eve. The scheme gives a
new method for teleportation, in which the fact of the
teleportation can neither be disavowed by the sender nor
be denied by the receiver. Because there are personal
keys Ka and Kb within the classical information Sa and
Sc, the disavowable behavior must be discovered by the
faithful arbitrator. The latter is a quantum secure direct
communication scheme based on digital signature. Since
H(x) is a one-way function, hence it is difficult for Eve
to read the message M from H(M). The test performed
by Alice and Bob can guarantee the security of the EPR
pairs which will be used to transmit the secret message.
Since the channel is safe, when Bob getsH(M) = H(M ′),
he can conclude that the signature of messageM is true.
At the same time, a one-way Hash function that Alice
and Bob possessed together is distributed by the faithful
4arbitrator, so if the sender is disavowable, whose action
can be found easily.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have proposed two avowable proto-
cols for quantum communication. One is a teleportation
protocol based on the quantum cryptography, which
can avoid disavowing. Another is a scheme for quantum
secure direct communication based on digital signature,
in which the receiver can validate the truth of the
information and avoid disavowing for the sender. It is
shown that our schemes are secure.
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